

FAA SMS Focus Group Employee reporting and Feedback Process 3.1.6 Sea-Tac September 3, 2009





Outline

- Air Methods Corp Info-mercial
- Reporting and Culture
- Challenges



Air Methods...At A Glance

- Employees
 - **3**,010
 - Headquarters Englewood, Colo.
- Bases
 - 105 Community
 - 144 Hospital
- Aircraft
 - **300+**
- States
 - **4**3
- Financial
 - NASDAQ Ticker: AIRM





History and Growth

- Founded in 1980
 - Roy Morgan
- First hospital program
 - St. Mary's, Grand Junction, Colo.
- 1997 Mercy Air Service
- 2000 ARCH
- 2002 Rocky Mountain Holdings
- 2007 CJ Systems
- 2009 Omniflight North Georgia and Atlanta







Who We Are

- Only air medical services provider with national presence under two service delivery models
 - HBS
 - CBS
- Offers all key core competencies in-house:
 - Aviation operations
 - Billing and collections
 - Dispatch and communications
 - Field maintenance
 - Medical staffing and training



Hospital-Based Services

- Hospital contracts for:
 - Aircraft
 - Pilots
 - Mechanics



- Supports major healthcare institutions and university medical centers
 - 173 aircraft
 - 144 bases









Hospital-Based Flight Programs





Community-Based Services

- Cooperative relationships with hospitals
 - Reduces hospital cost, risk and overhead
- National standard; local scope
- 127 aircraft
- 105 bases








Community-Based Flight Programs



GUTHRIE AIR



Combined Flight Services





Products Division-ODA Organization Designation Authorization

- Avionics completions
- Engineering/certification
- Government
- Manufacturing











Executive Leadership





Safety Initiatives





Employee Reporting and Feedback Systems

- AIDMOR-Accident Incident Damage Maintenance Operations Report
- ASAP-Aviation Safety Action Program
- MSAP-Maintenance Safety Action Program
- LOSA-Line Oriented Safety Audit
- Silent Whistle-Anonymous reporting
- TAMMA-The Air Methods Medical Application



AIDMOR


- Company wide safety occurrence reporting system
- Intra-disciplinary
- Some mandatory reporting
- Anonymous reporting option
- Atta-boys and commentary included in monthly safety newsletter
- Summary of all reports by aircraft type and category posted monthly on Company intranet portal



Separating fact from fiction: Are twin-engine helicopters safer than single-engine?

It's simple right. If a community is served by a twin engine air medical helicopter, by the simple fact that it has two engines, it must be two times safer. That's simply not true. In the last 18 months, the air medical industry has come under increasing scrutiny from regulators, the media and the public because of the rash of fatal accidents it experienced. The number of engines is not necessarily the panacea to improving the industry's margin of safety.

As technologies advanced and evolved over the decades, engines became more mature and more complex. Today, helicopter engines are technologically advanced, and feature a design with a reduced number of parts and modules for easy maintenance. Additionally, they are designed to operate under extreme conditions such as high altitude and hot temperature conditions. There is no industry data or evidence to support





the argument that twin-engine aircraft are safer. In fact, data refutes it. According to a recent study, for a 10.5-year period (January 1, 1998 through June 30, 2008) for all U.S. civil registered HEMS aircraft, there were 120 accidents. Twin engines accounted for 56.7% and single engines accounted for 43.3%.1 The research further breaks down twin engine versus single engine and possible cause (Figure 1). Of the 120 air medical accidents included in the study, 37.5% were attributable to 'outside' factor such as controlled flight into terrain and inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC). Next at 25% are 'strikes' such as wire strikes. At the 17.5% mark is the machine category, which encompasses engines, airframe and power loss, which was at 17.5%. Of



ASAP

- Initiated July 15, 2009
- Second HEMS operator to establish an ASAP
- WBAT-Web based application tool
- ERC meets Monthly
- LOA-Letter of Agreement
- Union established a professional standards committee
- Monthly summary is currently included in the Safety Connect
- Executive Summary discussed at the Monthly Safety Council meeting







MSAP

- ASAP was potentially exposing mechanics
- MOU submitted to FAA
- Two party agreement
- WBAT



LOSA-Line Oriented Safety Audit

- LOSA Collaborative •
- Developed TEM code book for single pilot HEMS operations
- Developed data collection format
- Developed observer training
- Non-jeopardy
- Voluntary
- Holistic
- October 19th
 - Initial 120 observations
 - 10-12 Observers
 - 6 programs
 - 3 fleet types
- Summary report





Draft - HEMS LOSA Data Collection Form - Draft

Sample 4.29.09

Observer ID	Obs21	Obs21	
Observation Type (Base, Hospital, Scene, Other)	Leg 1	Base to Hospital	
	Leg 2	Hospital to Base	
	Leg 3		
	Leg 4		
	Leg 5		
Operation Type (HBS or CBS)	HBS	HBS	
Base Location	San Antonio – University Hospital		
Helicopter Type	Bell 430		
Did you observe this crew from a previous observation?	No		
Pilot Shift Type (Day or Night)	Night	Night	
Pilot Shift Day of Shift Length	3 rd day	3 rd day of a 5 day shift	



Code Book ot Ops only)

Collaborative ERRORS	Threat and Error (EC-HEMS -1, Single Pik
Attempting or lining up for incorrect runway	
Unintentional bank deviation	E - DATEN E - DATEN
Unintentional incorrect takeoff technique	E - DATEN
Unintentional incorrect takes technique	2 - 1947EM
Unintentional approach too shallow (Risicotcolli unknown obstackes)	A - BATEM
Unintentional approach too steep (Posc of entry i state)	nto vortex ring
Unintentional landing deviation	noreased
Unintentional lateral deviation	Z - INTEN
Unintentional pitch deviation	Z - INTEN
Unintentional speed deviation	2 - INTEN
Unintentional vertical deviation	2 - INTEN
Unintentional vertical speed deviation	z - INTEN
Unintentional weather penetration	Z - INTEN Z - INTEN
Unintentional yaw deviation	z - INTEN
Unintentional unbelanced flight (elip ball out)	Z - INTEN
Unintentional insufficient obstacle cleanance	Z - INTEN
Unintentional turn onto course too low	Z-INTENT
z - INTENT T/O, App with tailwind above APM	Instations
z - INTENT- Accepting visual approach in nonvis	ual conditions
z - INTENT - Altitude deviation without ATC clear	ance as Other
z - INTENT - Course or heading deviation without	ATC clearance
z - INTENT- Decision to fly a profile that increase	d riuk.
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F - Flying a nonstandard visual approaci - Fiving maneuvera/tectics that increase risk Flying or "ducking below" the glideologie Landing deviation by choice al deviation by choice ation through known bad

- Departure without ATC clearance

- Speed deviation without ATC clearance - Speed deviation by choice
- T/O above placarded weight
- T/O without proper weight & balance figures
- sary low maneuver on approach
- Vertical deviation by choice T- Flying too low
- T- Insufficient obei
- T. Turn onto course too inv
- T- Approach too shallow
- Approach too steep
- NT Other manual flying erro nanual flying error




Silent Whistle

- Third Party Anonymous reporting
- Phone and computer access
- for employees, customer, vendors, investors etc.
- Quarterly brief during Safety Council



TAMMA

- Local program
- Includes operations, maintenance, medical, communications and customer
- Debriefing
- Report escalation
- Loop closure and followup





Feedback

- RCA
- Corrective Action Process
 - Loop closure and documentation
 - Employee feedback
 - Safety Connect
 - Intranet Portal
 - Safety Bulletin, Alert, Notice



Challenges

- Defining Positive Culture
 - What is it?
 - How do you measure it?
- Reporting vs. Analysis
- Intentional disregard vs. non-punitive
- Just culture vs. discretionary authority
- Local Reporting vs. Corporate knowledge
- Redundancy
- Consolidation



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